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Abstract 
 
This book chapter analyzes the Supreme Court’s decision in National 
Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) v. Sebelius.  Contra 
conventional wisdom, it argues that the pivotal opinion of Chief Justice 
Roberts is not well explained in federalism terms.  Rather, the decision is 
best understood in light of entrenched historical understandings of the 
federal government’s appropriate role in managing diverse species of 
risk.  
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1. Introduction 
 
 In the end, the market had it wrong. On June 28, 2012, Intrade 
estimated a seventy-percent-plus probability that the individual mandate 
component of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA)1 
would be invalidated. Reporting the decision’s hand-down, CNN ran a 
banner proclaiming invalidation for several minutes before switching 
content. But if the decision in National Federation of Independent Business 
(NFIB) v. Sebelius2 was a shock to mainstream media, it was no less 
surprising to constitutional scholars. Once its fragmented opinions had been 
assembled, the decision turned out not to flow simply from earlier 
precedent. To the contrary, the decision overruled no Supreme Court 
precedent and has ambiguous downstream consequences for legal doctrine. 
Its place in constitutional history is accordingly a puzzle. 
 
This essay offers an account of how NFIB v. Sebelius fits into that 
constitutional tradition. Rather than arising from the lawyerly paraphernalia 
of precedent, rules, and syllogistic reasoning, I argue that the NFIB Court’s 
reasoning takes root in profound (if poorly specified) first-order normative 
principles about the appropriate role of the federal government. To this end, 
I make two claims—one negative, the other positive. The first concerns 
federalism. The NFIB decision superficially turns on the relationship of the 
federal government to the states, and so reflects judicial calibration of an 
appropriate “federal balance.”3 Federalism, of course, has been a central 
term of American political contention.4 By the late twentieth century, 
‘federalism’ was invoked most often against federal regulation to favor state 
autonomy.5 On superficial reading, NFIB v. Sebelius seems to advance that 
decentralizing vision of federalism. But, I argue, federalism explains very 
little of its outcome. Examination of its central holdings suggests that the 
Court left the federal balance largely untouched.  
 
Second, in lieu of federalism, I suggest that a dyad of opposing 
values—liberty and risk—animate the Court’s ruling. The first half of this 
                                                 
1 Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). The PPACA was enacted alongside the Health 
Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 123 Stat. 1029. 
References to the PPACA or “Act” encompass both. 
2 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
3 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 578 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
4 Alison L. LaCroix, The Ideological Origins of American Federalism (2010). 
5 It is hard to generalize here. Some Justices who have fervently pressed federalism values, 
understood as states’ rights, in respect to state sovereign immunity and congressional 
power also are exceedingly willing to find federal law preempts state regulation.  
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pair is familiar: claims about liberty figured large in debates about the 
PPACA.6 It was less frequently observed in those debates that many species 
of risk management by the state limit some sort of ‘liberty’ as a cost of 
spreading or mitigating risk. The ensuing trade-offs implicate questions 
about when individuals should bear the costs of diffusing shared risks. 
While framed as a case about constitutional law, the NFIB opinion is, in my 
view, better glossed as a function of the Justices’ normative judgments 
about the permissible domain of risk-liberty equilibria the federal 
government can strike.  
 
2. The PPACA  
  
In an obvious sense, the PPACA concerns risk and how we manage 
it. Unique among wealthy democracies, the pre-PPACA United States 
possessed no “guaranteed health coverage for all (or virtually all) citizens or 
measures to contain costs at a high level of aggregation.”7 Consequently, 
nearly 87 million people were without insurance at some point between 
2007 and 2009, and 45,000 working-age Americas dying annually due to 
underinsurance.8 This is hardly a surprise. In a market-dominated system, 
competition predictably drives insurers toward actuarially fair pricing by 
which individuals must pay in line with the risks they represent regardless 
of ability to do so.9 Growing economic inequality since the 1970s has 
inevitably cashed out as more uneven distributions of healthcare coverage.10  
 
Despite these high social-welfare costs, serial attempts at healthcare 
reform since the Truman presidency have foundered in a “policy trap”: 
“[A]n increasingly costly and complicated system … satisfied enough of the 
public and so enriche[d] the health care industry as to make change 
extraordinarily difficult.”11 A combination of tax subsidies for employer-
provided insurance, ‘universal’ benefits such as Medicare, and some 
                                                 
6 See Christopher Schmidt, The Tea Party and the Constitution, 39 Hastings Const. L. 
Q.193, 237 (2011).  
7 Jacob Hacker, Health Care Reform 2.0: Fulfilling the Promise of the Affordable Care Act, 
in Shared Responsibility, Shared Risk: Government, Markets and Social Policy in the 
Twenty-First Century, 185, 186–87 (Jacob Hacker & Ann O’Leary eds., 2012). 
8 Id. at 189-90. 
9 See generally Jacob S. Hacker, The Great Risk Shift 140-43 (2006) [hereinafter Hacker, 
Great Risk Shift] (arguing that adverse selection leads to pervasive health care market 
failure in the United States). 
10 Paul Starr, Remedy and Reaction: The Peculiar American Struggle Over Health Care 
Reform 5 (2011). 
11 Id. at 2.  
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measure of ‘welfare’ measures such as Medicaid left uninsured “a mostly 
low-income population with no coherence, organization, or political 
power.”12 Given this, it was somewhat remarkable reform occurred at all.  
 
Even if political constraints did not foreclose reform, they 
nonetheless shaped it. The PPACA is thus modest along two salient 
dimensions. First, the Act focused on underinsurance, not cost-containment. 
Second, it made no attempt to recast the existing patchwork of private and 
public healthcare coverage. It instead accepted and broadened existing fonts 
of coverage. As a result, many dysfunctional elements remain, such as the 
regressive tax expenditures on employer contributions for medical 
insurance that cost the federal government about $177 billion in 2011.13  
 
At its core, the PPACA expands three longstanding elements of 
American healthcare provision.14 First, roughly sixty percent of working-
age Americans are now covered by employer-sponsored health insurance.15 
The Act largely exempts this large-group market from new regulations. It 
does require employers with more than 100 personnel to provide “minimum 
essential coverage” by 2014.16 The large-group market, though, is already 
regulated to redistribute risk. The Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act prohibits group health plans from discriminating on the 
basis of health factors respecting eligibility, benefits, or premiums.17 
Interestingly, this nondiscrimination rule injects risk spreading into market 
provision of health insurance, but is not (to date) politically controversial.   
 
Second, approximately a fifth of the public are covered by federal 
statutory programs such as Medicare or Medicaid.18 The 2010 Act “made 
                                                 
12 Id. at 7. 
13 Suzanne Mettler, Reconstituting the Submerged State: The Challenges of Social Policy 
Reform in the Obama Era, 8 Persp. Pol. 803, 806 (2010).  
14 The following relies on Tom Baker, Health Insurance, Risk, and Responsibility after the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 159 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1577, 1580-1607 (2012). 
15 Elise Gould, The Erosion of Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance: Declines Continue 
for the Seventh Year Running, 39 Int'l J. Health Servs. 669, 669 (2009) (“Employer-
sponsored health insurance (ESI) remains the most prominent form of health coverage in 
the United States, at 62.9 percent of the under-65 population; however, the rate of this 
coverage has fallen every year since 2000, when 68.3 percent had ESI.”).  
16 See Baker, supra note 14, at 1592–93 (summarizing PPACA regulation of the large-
group market). 
17 29 U.S.C. §1182 (2006). Health care plans are also covered by the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act of 1974 
18 Kaiser Family Foundation, Fast facts, Health Insurance Coverage in the U.S., 2011, 
available at http://facts.kff.org/chart.aspx?ch=2874 
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no fundamental changes to Medicare,”19 but its changes to Medicaid 
catalyzed public and judicial attention. Medicaid is a cooperative federalism 
program. It is jointly funded by the states and the federal government, 
although precise coverage definitions vary by state.20 States submit a “State 
Plan” to the Secretary of Health and Human Services for authorization.21 
Until the PPACA, the plan had to cover a series of defined groups, 
including the elderly, disabled, blind, pregnant, and children.22 The PPACA 
is the fifth statutory expansion of Medicaid,23 and adds a new mandatory 
category to state plans as of 2014. This new category comprises all citizens 
and legal residents with incomes up to 133 percent of the federal poverty 
line.24 It will add to Medicaid largely “non-elderly, non-disabled, low-
income single adults or couples without children.”25 The federal 
government provides full funding for the first three years of this expansion, 
gradually reducing its contribution to a floor of 90 percent in 2020.26 Under 
longstanding language in Medicaid’s organic statute, the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services may cut some or all of a state’s Medicaid 
funding if it fails to comply with certain obligations.27  
 
The final, and least functional, element of the healthcare landscape 
is the small-group and individual market. It is here that the PPACA does 
most of its work. As many readers will know, it introduces a suite of 
measures designed to expand and render accessible the private market for 
healthcare insurance. To this end, it imposes inter alia minimum essential 
coverage and community-rating rules on insurers; a mandate on states to 
create insurance exchanges to facilitate consumers’ purchases; and an 
“individual mandate” on lawful U.S. residents and citizens. With 
exceptions, the individual mandate provision requires any lawfully present 
person who lacks a defined quantum of minimum coverage as of 2014 to 
pay an escalating series of “penalt[ies]” (or “shared responsibility 
                                                 
19 Baker, supra note 14, at 1581-83 (noting slightly increased progressivity of Medicare 
financing under PPACA). 
20 See Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 37 (1981) (discussing scope of state 
discretion). 
21 42 U.S.C. § 1396. 
22 42 U.S.C. §1396a(a)(10)(A)(I)-(VII). 
23 Nicole Huberfield, Elizabeth Weeks Leonard & Kevin Outterson, Plunging into Endless 
Difficulties: Medicaid and Coercion in the Healthcare Cases 15 (2012), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2128760 
24 42 U.S.C. §1396a(a)(10)(A)(VIII). 
25 Huberfield et al. supra note 23, at 18. 
26 42 U.S.C. §1397d(y)(1). 
27 42 U.S.C. §1396c.  
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payments.”)28 Through these measures, the PPACA aims to nudge insurers 
to expand some coverage to the most needy, while preventing healthy 
individuals from exiting the insurance pool. The net intended result is a 
broad, diverse, and actuarially secure risk-pool.  
 
3. The Legal Challenges 
 
Within minutes of the PPACA’s enactment, states, individuals, and 
employers filed suit challenging the Act.29 The challenges, their counsel, 
and supporters drew from President Obama’s Republican and Tea Party 
opposition.30 But the litigation marked a startling public volte face for a 
Republican Party that in 2008 proclaimed (in a party platform no less) that 
“[j]udicial activism is a grave threat to the rule of law because 
unaccountable federal judges are usurping democracy.”31 In effect, elements 
of the Republican Party treated the federal courts as another stage in the 
federal legislative process on healthcare reform—one step beyond 
bicameralism and presentment. Whatever other long-term effects the case 
has, its first consequence was thus bipartisan ratification of the federal 
bench as the Toquevillian cockpit for resolution of divisive national policy 
questions.32  
 
The federal courts, however, are not mere extensions of Congress. 
Interest groups well-positioned to influence elected officials are not 
necessarily capable of persuading judges. Law and politics are distinct 
mechanisms for the exercise of power in the United States. Different 
resources—fiscal and ideological—matter. In Congress, so-called big 
business, as represented by, say, the Chamber of Commerce, often prevails. 
In the courts, employers did not fare so well—their challenge to the 
PPACA’s employer mandate fizzled.33 After divergent results in various 
                                                 
28 26 U.S.C. §5000A(b). 
29 Complaint, Florida v. U.S. Dep't. of Health & Human Servs., No. 3:10-cv-91-RV-EMT 
(N.D. Fla. Mar. 23, 2010). 
30 For enumeration of plaintiffs and counsel, see Ilya Shapiro, A Long Strange Trip: My 
First Year Challenging the Constitutionality of Obamacare, 6 FIU L. Rev. 29, 33–34 
(2010).  
31 Republican National Committee, 2008 Republican Platform, Government Reform, 
http://www.gop.com/2008Platform/GovernmentReform.htm 
32 Chief Justice Roberts’s averment of “respect for Congress’s policy judgments” at the 
opening of his opinion, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 25790–80 (2012), assumes a different cast in this 
light.  
33 See, e.g., Florida ex rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services 716 
F.Supp.2d 1120 (N.D. Fla. 2010) (dismissing challenges to employer mandate).  
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federal courts of appeals,34 it was the challenges to the individual mandate 
and the Medicaid expansion that made it to the Supreme Court.35 It was 
states and self-declared mavens of liberty who seemed to have caught the 
Court’s ear.  
 
The bottom line of the ensuing decision is this: The Court upheld 
both the individual mandate and the Medicaid expansion but invalidated the 
federal government’s power to punish states’ failure to expand Medicaid by 
withholding all Medicaid funds.36 All parts of PPACA went into effect, but 
the federal government lost a stick to punish recalcitrant states. That simple 
result, however, obscures complex details. Across 193 pages of the U.S. 
Reports, nine Justices filed four interlocking, overlapping, and antinomial 
opinions—an opinion “for the Court” by Chief Justice Roberts (joined in 
places by Justices Breyer and Kagan); a partial concurrence by Justices 
Ginsburg and Sotomayor (also joined in places by Breyer and Kagan); a 
joint dissent from Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito; and a short 
solo dissent from Justice Thomas. Discerning the legally binding ‘holding’ 
of the case requires some parsing to discern the narrowest ground of 
decision to which a majority of Justices ascribed.37 But ignoring some 
important technicalities, it can plausibly be said that the opinion rests on 
three central questions: (1) Is imposition of the individual mandate within 
Congress’s Article I power to regulate commerce, or, (2) alternatively 
within its power to tax for the General Welfare? And (3) does the Medicaid 
expansion violate the constitutional principle of federalism enshrined in the 
Tenth Amendment to the Constitution? Briefly, the answers are probably 
not, certainly yes, and somewhat. 
 
To begin with, the Chief Justice and the joint dissent reasoned that 
the Commerce Clause—long the most important repository of federal 
regulatory authority—could not underwrite the individual mandate.38 
According to the Chief Justice, the federal government has no Commerce 
Clause power to mandate insurance purchases by otherwise healthy 
individuals, even if they are likely later to need coverage. Previous cases, 
however, had permitted regulatory extrusions beyond the Commerce 
                                                 
34 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2580–81 (describing outcomes in D.C. Circuit, Fourth, Sixth, and 
Eleventh Circuit courts of appeals). 
35 132 S. Ct. 603 (2011). 
36 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2608. 
37 See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977). 
38 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2585-93 (Roberts, C.J.); id. at 2644-55. For a discussion of the 
Commerce Clause, see Aziz Z. Huq, Tiers of Scrutiny in Enumerated Powers 
Jurisprudence, 79 U. Chi. L. Rev. – (forthcoming 2013). 
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Clause’s scope in light of Congress’s supplemental power to enact 
“Necessary and Proper” additions to comprehensive federal regulatory 
schemes.39 The mandate was fairly plainly a necessary element to the 
general scheme of healthcare regulation. Roberts, however, rejected this 
possibility by stating that Congress’s Necessary and Proper did not 
encompass “any great substantive and independent power[s]” such as 
mandating the execution of a contract where none previously existed.40  
 
A different coalition of five Justices, again with the Chief Justice 
penning the crucial opinion, then sustained the individual mandate as a 
valid exercise of congressional taxing authority.41 Roberts semaphored that 
such authority had limits: A tax tipped over into an impermissible “mere 
penalty” when it eviscerated the individual’s “lawful choice to do or not do 
a certain act.”42 Quite when this happens, Roberts declined to specify. 
 
The final element of the decision concerned the Medicaid 
expansion. Again, Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion is useful taken as the 
dispositive guide. Until 2012, the Court had placed only modest restraints 
on the federal government’s power to impose conditions on grants to the 
states.43 These largely pertained to the clarity of conditions.44 This rule 
treated states as capable bargaining partners, but policed federal shading on 
statutory deals via a clear notice requirement. The notice rule found 
additional justification as a means of fostering democratic accountability: It 
lowered the cost to voters of ascertaining when a given rule was mandated 
by state or federal law. Under these precedents, the Medicaid expansion 
seemingly presented no constitutional worry. States have been on notice 
since the program’s inception of Congress’s unfettered “right to alter, 
amend, or repeal any provision” of the Medicaid statute.45 Nor was there 
much doubt which level of government should be held accountable for 
“Obamacare.”  
 
But Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion ignored the notice rule. He first 
said that the statutory reservation of authority to change Medicaid could not 
possibly mean what it said. Instead, Roberts asserted, the Medicaid 
                                                 
39 The leading case is Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
40 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2591-92.  
41 Id. at 2593-2601. 
42 Id. at 2599-2600. 
43 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987). 
44 Sossamon v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 1651, 1658 (2011). 
45 42 U.S.C. §1304. 
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expansion was “a shift in kind, not merely degree,” between “old” Medicaid 
and “new Medicaid.”46 The new program, he explained, “is no longer a 
program to care for the neediest among us, but rather an element of a 
comprehensive national plan to provide universal health insurance 
coverage.”47 Citing the magnitude of Medicaid spending as a proportion of 
state’s budgets (about a fifth), Roberts proclaimed that the power to 
withdraw all Medicaid funding for failure to participate in the 2011 
expansion was a “gun to the head” and “economic dragooning that leaves 
the States with no real option but to acquiesce.”48 Again without specifying 
any analytically crisp rule, he held that the power to withdraw all Medicaid 
funding was unconstitutionally coercive and therefore could not be 
exercised.49  
 
4. Estimating the Footprint of NFIB v. Sebelius  
 
 Not since the New Deal has the Court seriously grappled with the 
constitutionality of a major federal social program.50 So anticipation of the 
decision ran high. But the decision’s immediate footprint, measured as a 
matter of constitutional doctrine or public policy, was faint. The Court 
overruled no earlier precedent, even though it had previously issued rulings 
upholding sweeping New Deal and post-New Deal regulatory programs. To 
the chagrin of commentators who hoped the Court would retrench federal 
power back to pre-New Deal contours, only Justice Thomas even hinted at a 
desire to go that far, and then in a conspicuously lonesome dissent.51  
 
As to the cash value of NFIB’s new rules, the decision casts no 
existing federal program into constitutional peril. The leading legislative 
proposal that would face potential constitutional objections under the 
decision is the proposal to substitute social security with mandatory 
individualized retirement accounts—ironically, an idea typically offered by 
right-of-center politicians and think-tanks.52 Even with social-security 
privatization, it is not hard to imagine that any now-unconstitutional 
mechanism could be replicated with well-designed tax incentives.  
 
                                                 
46 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2605-06. 
47 Id.  
48 Id. at 2604-05. 
49 Id. at 2641-42. 
50 The Court, however, on several occasions grappled with the constitutionality of major 
civil rights laws. See, e.g. Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).  
51 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2677 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
52 Hacker, The Great Risk Shift, supra note 9, at 37. 
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Perhaps more consequential is the absence of any litmus test for 
ascertaining what constitutes an impermissibly coercive exercise of federal 
spending. This means there is no way to predict when any change to 
conditional spending efforts, including other elements of the PPACA’s 
amendments to the Medicaid statute, may risk invalidation. Judicial refusal 
to elaborate a clear rule leaves legislative drafters at sea. Because legislators 
must labor under the burden of large ambiguity as to whether their 
compromises will hold, some otherwise-viable deals will not be made. 
Some states will not benefit from sought-for federal spending because they 
fear a ‘heckler’s veto’ by other litigious states. When legislation does 
emerge, it is likely be delayed and impeded by judicial challenges, frittering 
away federal dollars on lawyering in lieu of social goods. Ironically, the 
Chief Justice has elsewhere railed against rules that create open-ended 
uncertainty.53  
 
In sum, the NFIB presents something of a mystery. It does not break 
from, or even really extend, past precedent. It impacts immediately no 
federal program other than the PPACA—and then only at the margin. At 
best, its most immediate consequences flow from the absence of decision, 
not the content of its announced rules. How can we account for such an 
opinion? In what follows, I offer an account of its immanent logic, i.e., the 
first-order normative principles that best fit the Court’s judgment. To begin 
with, though, we must examine and eliminate the most obvious explanation 
for the decision—federalism.  
 
5. Federalism as Faux Ami 
 
 The Court typically frames questions about the scope of federal 
power as a matter of federalism—i.e., the balance of authority between the 
several states and the national government. Vigilant policing of the outer 
boundaries to Congress’s power is underwritten by the Court’s perception 
that wayward federal lawmakers have only fragile incentives to honor 
states’ interests on Capitol Hill.54 At first blush, the Medicaid holding—
framed initially by litigators in terms of states’ rights and the Tenth 
Amendment—seems squarely a function of judicial recalibration of the 
federal-state balance.  
 
                                                 
53 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. 868, 893–99 (2009) (Roberts, J., 
dissenting), 
54 Id. at 578 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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Yet this moves too quickly. In my view, none of the main elements 
of NFIB v. Sebelius are well-explained by federalism concerns. To see this, 
we need to take each holding in sequence. As a threshold matter, neither the 
Commerce Clause nor the Taxing Power rulings have any clear effect on 
the scope of state regulatory authority. At best, the Court preserved a 
domain of state authority over mandatory purchases and capped one species 
of taxation. It is hard to see much practical significance in either holding. 
On the one hand, it is difficult to conjure up state mandatory-purpose laws 
that have free reign now given the Commerce Clause holding. But what 
good is fencing off a domain of independent state authority if it scarcely 
sees usage? In any case, it will often be feasible to reframe impermissible 
federal interference with inactivity as valid regulation of an activity. 
Consider, for example, the PPACA individual mandate. Had it been 
invalidated, Congress could—politics permitting—have rewritten the law to 
mandate receipt of healthcare on the possession of continuing adequate 
insurance coverage. Close, if not perfect, substitutes are thus often available 
when the constitutional bar on federally mandated purchases kicks in. On 
the other hand, the Court’s constraint on the Taxing Power matters only so 
far as it protects states’ purses by reducing the ‘crowding out’ effect of 
federal taxes.55 But even if the Court limited federal taxes on activities, it 
did not address income or capital taxes. Any effect on federal crowd-out of 
state taxes from NFIB will consequently be de minimus in character.  
 
Additionally, there is less federalism ‘bite’ in NFIB’s conditional 
spending holding than first appears. Indeed, the Court’s holding may even 
diminish states’ latitude to strike beneficial bargains with the federal 
government. After NFIB, the federal government must be leery of entering 
into long-term cooperative federalism programs pursuant to which states 
develop implementation apparatuses. It must rationally anticipate being 
locked into such relationship on judicially specified terms. At least in some 
cases, Pareto-optimal deals may not be struck because of this uncertainty. 
Some states will lose out because beneficial cooperative federal programs 
will not be created or expanded.  
 
The Court’s claim that states were ‘coerced’ also hides analytic 
confusion. In other constitutional cases, the Court tends to disparage 
individual claims of coercion.56 As a result, it has developed no definition 
                                                 
55 See Brian Galle, A Republic of the Mind: Cognitive Biases, Fiscal Federalism, and 
Section 164 of the Tax Code, 82 Ind. L.J. 673, 702–09 (2007) 
56 See Janice Nadler, No Need to Shout: Bus Sweeps and the Psychology of Coercion, 
2002 Sup. Ct. Rev. 153.  
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of individual coercion. In NFIB, this inchoate, haphazard concept of 
individual coercion is applied to an anthropomorphized, subnational 
sovereign.57 The result inevitably has an ad hoc flavor. So although the 
Court intimated that states’ settled expectations had been disrupted,58 it is 
unclear why. Unlike individuals, states lack psychological dispositions such 
as anticipation. They also lack any constitutional entitlement to Medicaid 
funding. To the contrary, they can plainly operate without such federal 
subvention. As recently as 1982, Arizona opted wholly out of Medicaid.59 A 
funding cutoff now would leave a state with two options: raise taxes or 
allow the poor to go without healthcare. Why should states be spared this 
fundamental public choice? Why in particular should deregulation-minded 
Republican governors who resisted the PPACA benefit from an entitlement 
to federal subsidies for welfare programs? Isn’t this to allow them to have 
their deregulatory cake while also ‘consuming’ federally funding for 
regulation? 
 
Even if states could be coerced, another problem comes into view. 
Judicial protection of states against coercion rests on the assumption that 
states are not full sovereign entities capable of contracting freely with the 
federal government. Superseding a notice regime with a coercion regime, 
the Court treated states as callow naïfs unable to navigate the political 
world. Rather than treating them with “dignity,”60 the NFIB Court took 
states as wards. In expressive and substantive terms, then, the conditional-
spending holding in NFIB v. Sebelius cannot be glossed in terms of 
federalism terms any more than the Commerce Clause and Taxing Power 
holdings can. Another analytic frame is needed to explain the decision. 
 
6. The Liberty-Risk Dyad 
 
 A central role of government is managing risk through prevention, 
risk-shifting, and -spreading.61 Since the Founding, governments in the 
United States have installed risk management policies, from limited 
liability, early banking regulation, and bankruptcy laws, to intellectual and 
                                                 
57 For a review of debates on coercion, see Aziz Z. Huq, Peonage and Contractual Liberty, 
101 Colum. L. Rev. 351, 367-70 (2001). 
58 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2604-05. 
59 Huberfield et al., supra note 23, at 11, n.71. 
60 Judith Resnik & Julie Chi-hye Suk, Adding Insult to Injury: Questioning the Role of 
Dignity in Conceptions of Sovereignty, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 1921 (2003). 
61 Tom Baker & David Moss, Government as Risk Manager, in New Perspectives on 
Regulation 87 (David Moss & John Cisternino eds., 2009). 
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real property rights.62 In recent decades, the federal government has 
experimented with new institutional forms to produce security against 
pandemic illnesses, terrorist attack, natural catastrophes, and economic 
shocks.63 
 
 Yet risk regulation has always been controversial.64 It often entails 
taxes, liabilities, or penalties on others better able to mitigate or absorb risk. 
The marginal social welfare cost of suffering different risks varies 
immensely by wealth and social circumstances. As a result of these 
dynamics, the choice of which risk to address (and how to do so) 
necessarily has redistributive consequences. Concomitantly, risk regulation 
is a focal point for interest-group activity and intensive ideological 
investments aimed at either legitimating or discrediting the federal 
regulatory state. Anti-statist, laissez-faire intuitions, coupled to nostalgic 
invocation of a prelapsarian smaller state, persist in American political 
culture.  
 
NFIB is profitably understood as an attempt to constitutionalism the 
fraught question of how to calibrate the federal role in managing risk in 
relation to lost liberties. Although the Constitution contains no express 
theory of risk regulation, each of the three elements of the NFIB decision 
can be interpreted as an attempt to place boundaries around the state’s 
operation as risk manager—to calibrate, that is, the permissible range of 
equilibria between social risk and individual liberty. Rather than grounding 
this analysis in a simple or familiar social welfare function, however, the 
Court’s analysis employs categories drawn from American history to 
articulate a normative vision of what the federal government can and cannot 
do. 
 
Consider first NFIB’s Commerce Clause and the Taxing Power 
holdings. Both turn on a judgment about the appropriate quantum of social 
risk that can be assigned to an individual. The axial moment in Roberts’s 
Commerce Clause reasoning holding is his assertion that a federal power to 
mandate purchases falls outside both the Commerce Clause and the 
Necessary and Proper powers because it is a “great substantive and 
independent power.” Set aside for a moment the peculiar genealogy of that 
                                                 
62 David A. Moss, When All Else Fails: Government as the Ultimate Risk Manager 2-9, 
295-325 (2002). 
63 See Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Governing Security: The Hidden Origins of American 
Security Agencies (2012).  
64 Moss, supra note 62, at 296-302. 
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last phrase, which has not figured in the U.S. reports for almost 200 years.65 
Focus rather on the question why a power to mandate purchases should fall 
into the category. Only two years before NFIB, the Court had read the 
Necessary and Proper Clause to extend other enumerated powers to reach a 
confinement power even in the absence of any criminal conviction.66 Since 
this earlier ruling was not overruled, NFIB’s conclusion implies that it is 
“great substantive and independent power” to require a person to enter a 
contract, but not to lock that same person up without criminal trial. To say 
the least, the intuition here is not obvious. Nothing in the Constitution’s text 
predicts it. Nor is it obviously justified in welfarist terms.  
 
The basic idea that decisions about private contracting relationships 
are beyond the reach of the state, however, is not unfamiliar to students of 
American legal thought. In the postbellum “classical” period of American 
legal thought, scholars and judges refined a notion of the “liberty of 
contract.” State and federal courts then pressed this into service to resist for 
Progressive-Era and the New-Deal regulation of a redistributive bent.67 
Under the liberty-of-contract rubric, judges struck down minimum wage 
and maximum hour laws, labor laws, and union-protective measures. 
According to one of its theorists, William Graham Sumner, liberty of 
contract reflected and promoted a “society of free and independent men, 
who form ties without favor or obligation, and co-operate without cringing 
or intrigue … [that] gives the utmost room and chance for individual 
development, and for all the self-reliance and dignity of a free man.”68 That 
is, it carved out a space of atomized, individual liberty against the 
emasculating risk-spreading depredations of the state. 
 
The analogy between the NFIB opinion and old-style liberty of 
contract is, to be sure, inexact. The Court in 2012 did not invalidate a 
legislative prohibition on contracting, as in earlier cases. It stuck down a 
legislative mandate to contract. But both liberty to contract and liberty from 
contract are plausibly understood as rooted in the same ideal—Sumner’s 
“society of free and independent men.” Sumner implicitly contrasted a 
masculine norm of rugged, autonomous personhood against a vision of 
government risk-managers as the fons et origo of emasculating “ties [of] 
                                                 
65 See Andrew Koppelman, ‘Necessary,’ ‘Proper,’ and Health Care Reform, available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2010192. 
66 United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010). 
67 See Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 873 (1987). 
68 William Graham Sumner, What Social Classes Owe to Each Other 23 (Caxton Printers 
1986) (1883). 
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favor [and] obligation.” Although there is little chance that the Court will 
return soon to a full-blooded embrace of liberty of contract, the NFIB 
decision demonstrates that latter idea may still inform at the margin judicial 
approaches in cases where government risk-regulation can be framed as 
constitutionally doubtful. 
 
The Court’s Taxing Power logic has a similar cast. The Court does 
not question the federal government’s power to impose taxes, but intimates 
that it cannot use this power to mandate the internalization of all spillover 
effects of risky individual behavior.69 The Court flags an outer boundary at 
which personal autonomy trumps collective social welfare. Each must then 
stand or fall on their own. To many, the Court’s insistence that the 
Constitution protects the wealthy and healthy from being required to 
contribute to mitigating the health perils of indigence will seem ungrounded 
in constitutional text and morally obtuse. But perhaps that’s the point. It is 
harsh medicine indeed to be “free and independent.”  
 
Just like the Commerce Clause and Taxing Power decisions, the 
Court’s treatment of the Medicaid expansion rests on an implicit normative 
account of constitutionally permission risk-liberty trade-offs. Again, this 
normative theory is not derived from the Constitution’s text. Again, it seems 
guided by unstated assumptions about the moral desert of different 
recipients of government largesse. Again, the Court’s normative boundaries 
have a somewhat gendered cast. 
 
There are two risk-related dynamics at work in NFIB’s conditional 
spending holding. First, recall that the NFIB Court took states to be 
incapable of freely contracting with the federal government, instead treating 
them as quasi-wards of the Court. This holding shelters not only states’ 
purses by allowing them to resist changes to Medicaid while maintaining 
historical levels of federal support, but also sheltered state politicians, who 
could avoid potentially hard choices between raising taxes and slashing 
benefits. In effect, the Court gave states and their elected leaders a species 
of constitutionally embedded insurance against future federal-policy-change 
risk: Even if a statute warns plainly warns that a cooperative program may 
change over time, the Constitution thus requires the lion’s share of change-
related risk to fall on the federal government, not the states. Like any 
beneficiary of a compulsory insurance policy, state officials likely will fall 
                                                 
69 Analogously, the Court has held that the Constitution bars tort judgments that aim to 
fully deter, and thus fully internalize social costs, in circumstances of imperfect 
enforcement. See, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008). 
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prey to moral hazard—here, by shading on the new Medicaid program or 
scanting other federal requirements. This compulsory insurance term thus 
redistributes risk from state governments to individuals. It exposes the most 
impoverished and vulnerable slices of the population to greater expected 
health risk, while amplifying the political and fiscal capital of state elites. 
 
The conditional spending holding implies a second normative 
judgment about when and how government can legitimately step in as risk 
manager. A central move in Roberts’s analysis is the assertion that the 
PPACA effectuated “a shift in kind, not merely degree,” between “old” 
Medicaid and “new Medicaid.”70 The Chief Justice glossed this assertion by 
noting that Medicaid, as expanded, was “no longer a program to care for the 
neediest among us.”71 Of course, given the relatively low floor on 
eligibility, it is not obvious this is literally true. Further, federal law already 
mandated coverage up to 133 percent of the poverty line for some groups. 
Why then was extending this higher cut-off to other groups the crossing of a 
constitutional Rubicon?72 The reasons given in the opinion are 
unpersuasive. Roberts glossed his ‘different of kind, not quantity’ argument 
by pointing out that the Medicaid expansion had been enacted as part of 
comprehensive healthcare reform. But this is a non-sequitor. There is no 
reason to conclude that enactment context radically changed the effects of 
Medicaid reform. Moreover, it is not at all clear how the 2012 change is 
qualitatively distinct from five earlier changes beginning in 1967, which 
have included coverage expansions to reach young adults; redefinitions of 
mandatory benefit packages; and (most recently) major changes to the scope 
of prescription drug coverage.73 All these had significant fiscal and health 
consequences. Why then was the 2010 amendment distinct? 
 
To understand the Court’s reasoning, we can instead focus on Chief 
Justice Roberts’s italicized observation that the PPACA required states “to 
cover all individuals under the age of 65 with incomes below 133 percent of 
the federal poverty line.”74 The key word is the one that Roberts italicized: 
“all.” The objection here is not that those at 133 percent of the poverty line 
are not in desperate straits –although that would be a controversial and 
                                                 
70 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2605-06. 
71 Id. 
72 Huberfield et al. supra note 23, at 14. The federal poverty is not an objective measure of 
need. Diana Karter Appelbaum. The Level of the Poverty Line: A Historical Survey, 51 
Soc. Sci. Rev. 514 (1977). 
73 Huberfield et al. supra note 23, at 15–16. 
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hardly self-evident claim. Rather, Roberts’ point is that Medicaid had gone 
from covering largely women and children to one that covered the poor 
generally. That is, it was only when Medicaid ceased to concern women 
and children only—and when it extended to poor men too that the program 
changed in “kind, not merely degree.” The expected gender identity of 
Medicaid recipients hence seems at work in the Court’s analysis.  
 
We might gloss this line of argument as follows. States, the Court 
reasons, have a constitutionally protected expectation of what Medicaid 
covers. This expectation rests upon a “recognizably gendered vie[w] of 
what a welfare state should offer”—one that has been extensively analyzed 
by social historians.75 As summarized recently by one historian, the United 
States developed in the twentieth-century a “discriminatory ‘two-track’ 
welfare state” that endows “white, male industrial workers and their 
dependents” with stable entitlement programs, while women and minorities 
are streamed into fiscally fragile and socially stigmatizing welfare 
programs.”76 Notwithstanding the recent vintage of this model, the NFIB 
Court treated this dichotomized model of welfare as constitutionally 
protected. It assumed, in other words, that states were entitled by the 
Constitution to rely on the existence of cooperative welfare programs that 
encompassed only those traditionally treated as deserving within the 
moralized, stereotyping lineaments of a gendered welfare state. It is worth 
noting that different coalitions of the Court have elsewhere warned that 
rules resting on the “social and economic inferiority of women” receive 
heightened equal protection scrutiny.77  
 
The Court’s reasoning, in short, not only allocates risk between 
states and the federal government, but also entrenches hierarchical and 
subordinating modalities of managing social risk first developed in the early 
twentieth century. In this fashion, the decision can be understood as 
enforcing plural normative limits on the federal government’s role as risk 
manager beyond the liberty of contract.   
 
                                                 
75 Linda Gordon, Social Insurance and Public Assistance: The Influence of Gender in 
Welfare Thought in the United States, 1879-1935, 97 Am. Hist. Rev. 19, 19 (1992) 
76 Karen Tani, Welfare and Rights Before the Movement: Rights as a Language of the 
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7. Conclusion  
 
Not federalism, but a constitutionalized view of normatively 
permissible risk-liberty trade-off best explains NFIB. That normative vision 
is not grounded in constitutional text or tradition. It instead reflects laissez-
faire instincts and gendered understandings of welfare familiar from the 
early twentieth-century. Designers of future social insurance programs 
would do well to bear in mind this lingering historical hangover in the 
federal bench. Others may well reflect on whether it reflects a desirable 
approach to managing risk in our diverse, hazard-filled Republic. 
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